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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VoL. 34
as an information in a criminal proceeding for a reckless driving charge be-
cause statutory procedure had not been followed. The court further indicated
that such a ticket would not even suffice as a summons.10
No doubt the volume of motor vehicle violations necessitates expeditious
disposition of offenders, but it is submitted that such a situation does not
justify circumvention of the rights of the accused by eliminating the establish-
ed statutory procedure. There is possibly a present need to amend the exist-
ing statutory procedure, but until the legislature enacts such statutes the
courts are under a duty to administer the procedure that has been adopted
and is currently in force.
DENNIS M. SOBOLIK.
DIVORCE - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - ALIMONY OR JUDGMENT
DEBT REGARDING IMPRISONMENT FOR CONTEMPT. - Parties contemplating a
divorce entered into a property settlement agreement which was adopted and
made part of the divorce decree. The husband's failure to abide by the agree-
ment led to a contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court of California, one
justice dissenting, held that the payments due under the agreement consti-
tuted an adjustment of property interests, rather than alimony, support, or
maintenance,' and therefore was a "debt" within the constitutional prohibi-
tion against imprisonment for debt.2 Bradley v. Superior Court of California,
48 Cal. 2d- 310 P.2d 634 (1957).
Contempt proceedings for failure to comply with a court order, brought
about through property settlements which have been crystallized in the di-
vorce decree, have led to many irreconcilable conflicts. 3 The determinative
factor is whether the agreement is a substitute for alimony or support,4 or is
merely in the nature of a settlement or division of the property rights of the
parties.
The more generally prevailing view is that decrees requiring compliance
with a property settlement agreement are not alimony and therefore not en-
forceable by contempt proceedings.5 The proponents of this view believe that
of the N. D. Const. which provides that all prosecutions in police magistrates and justice
of the peace courts shall proceed by way of information. Compare, § 29-0101 of the N.
D. Rev. Code of 1943 which states that every public offense must be prose.utfd by in-
formation or indictment unless it is one in which trial may be had in justicc, police, or
county court.
10. State v. Trygg, (Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., N. D. 1957). The court stated that
"when a document, such as this one is, bears a semblance of a legal document and pur-
ports to be issued pursuant to law . . . even though such document may not be actuially
a legally sufficient document, it is a simulation of a legal document which would be
sufficient to the ordinary citizen to indicate that his attendance had been legally re-
quired".
1. Ex parte Stephensen, 252 Ala. 316, 40 So. 2d 716 (1949); Application of Martin,
76 Idaho 199, 279 P.2d 873 (1955); Clubb v. Clubb, 334 Ill. App. 599, 80 N.E.2d 94
(1948); Wojahn v. Halter, 229 Minn. 374, 39 N.W.2d 545 (1949) (It is generally
agreed that alimony and child support payments do not constitute a debt within the con-
stitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt).
2. Calif. Const., art I, § 15.
3. 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, (2d ed. 1945) § 16.08.
4. Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 184 (1851); State ex rel Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566,
64 N.E. 567 (1902); West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S.E. 876 (1920) (Takes view
that alimony is itself an adjustment of property rights).
5. Buchman v. Buchman, 157 Md. 166, 145 Al. 488 (1929); Frohnapel v. Froh-
napel, 309 Mich. 215, 15 N.W.2d 137 (1944); Goldfish v. Goldfish, 184 N.Y.Supp. 512,
193 App.Div. 686 (1st Dept. 1920) Af'd 230 N.Y. 607, 130 N.E. 912 (1921). But see
Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E.2d 576 (1942).
RECENT CASES
where spouses bargain with each other and agree that terms of their contract
shall thereafter define their rights and obligations inter se, then it is to the
contract alone (and to conventional civil proceedings for enforcement of con-
tract rights) that they must look for a remedy in the event of a breach.
While inclusion of such a contract in the decree of divorce may furnish a
basis for subsequent proceedings leading to issuance of a writ of execution, it
cannot support commitment for failure to pay a judgment debt.6
The minority view takes the position that the problem here presented is
not enforcement of an agreement by contempt proceedings, but is rather the
enforcement by contempt proceedings of a decree which has incorporated
therein an agreement. The decree which incorporates an agreement is a
decree of court and the agreement is superseded by that decree. T The obli-
gations thus imposed are not those imposed by contract, but by decree,8 and
are enforceable as suchy
It is submitted that the lawyer attempting to do justice by his client is
presently placed in a confused and bewildered position. What clear cut and
determinative advice can be given to a client when the law is such that
lawyers and judges alike have extreme difficulty in unraveling situations as
that which is presented in the instant case. If incorporation of the agree-
ment into a court decree has no practical effect it should be omitted and
subsequently silence confusion and unnecessary litigation.
W. T. DsLLENnERG.
EXTRADITION - INTERSTATE EXTRADrrION - EXTRADI .IOI'. OF NoN-FuceI-
TivEs. - Plaintiff in error was charged in Nebraska with the crime of non-
support of his wife and children. Nebraska demanded cxtradition under the
federal law. The District Court of Colorado denied the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus after the plaintiff in error had been taken into custody pur-
suant to the extradition request. The Supreme Court, one justice dissenting,
held that, since petitioner never lived in Nebraska and his wife left him and
took their children to that state, he was not subject to extradition by Ne-
braska as a fugitive and was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus discharging
him from custody. Matthews v. People, 314 P.2d 906 (Colo. 1957) .
Extradition, has been established in the several states b' the Constitution!
and the laws of the United States. 3 The Federal Constitution and implement-
6. Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d, 310 P.2d 634 (1957); Dickey v. Dickey.
154 Md. 675, 141 At. 387 (1928); Merritt v. Merritt, 237 N.C. 271, 74 S.E.2d 529
(1953); Stull v. Stull, 126 Pa. 255, 191 At. 187 (1937).
7. Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 94, 14 S.E.2d 681 (1941); Holloway v. Holloway, 130
Ohio 214, 198 N.E. 579 (1935).
8. Compare Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 617, 107 P.2d 249 (1940), with Solo-
mon v. Solomon, 149 Fla. 174, 5 So. 2d 265 (1941) (If merely ratified but not madt.
part of decree, the husband then is not responsible in contempt proceedings).
9. Clubb v. Clubb, 334 Ill.App. 599, 80 N.E.2d 94 (1948).
1. Extradition is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). "The surrender
by one state to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its
own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which being competent
to try and punish him, demands the surrender."
2. U. S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. "A person charged in any state with treason,
felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall
on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to
be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1952).
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